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1. Introduction 
 
Local public finances are currently under considerable stress and the financial crisis 
serves only to highlight the need to rethink both expenditure and revenue policies at all 
levels of government. The situation is particularly critical among Spanish 
municipalities, which as the level of government closest to the citizens (voters) are 
responsible for delivering the most highly demanded public services, at a time when the 
Spanish financing system is failing to provide these authorities with adequate revenue 
tools to meet such demands. The outlook is even worse for large municipalities that 
have to provide services for which they are not in fact responsible, given that no other 
tier of government can satisfy these citizen needs. Moreover, because of their large 
urban areas, these municipalities are beset by a series of problems that have a direct 
impact on their local budget, but which are not contemplated by the local financing 
system. In the light of this current situation, the aim of this article is to estimate the 
impact on the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of being a large capital or central 
municipality. 
In terms of costs, the expenditure needs of large municipalities differ from those of 
other municipalities as their specific socioeconomic characteristics generate both 
central (the so-called overloading effects, concentration of social problems and/or 
congestion costs) and capital costs (including, the substitution of productive activities 
with less productive administrative activities or the loss of fiscal revenue because of the 
tax exemption of administrative activities). 
Outside Spain, Washington D.C. is a good illustration of a city whose central and 
capital costs have not been solved by granting it a special financing system, but rather 
by increasing the percentage of financing of some of the federal transfer programmes 
and requiring the federal government to accept the provision of certain services (prisons 
and civil service pensions). A further illustration is provided by the case of the United 
Kingdom, where a system of unconditional transfers to municipalities, based on 
sophisticated methods of calculation, seeks to take into account certain factors related to 
central costs (McLean and McMillan, 2003; Midwinter, 2002). 
In terms of revenue, the capital and/or central nature of a municipality may affect 
the decisions of individuals and firms when choosing where to locate in the territory 
and, therefore, have an impact on the size of the tax base for each municipality (fiscal 
capacity). According to Ladd and Bradbury (1988), the fiscal capacity of a sub-central 
government depends on the decisions adopted by individuals and enterprises, which in 
turn depend on the perceived costs and benefits from the localisation in the territory of 
this sub-central government. For instance, large municipalities can earn more income 
through property tax (tourism) or fees and public prices (commuters). 
The main contribution of this paper is to analyse the factors that affect large 
municipalities’ expenditure needs and to determine whether these same factors also 
have a positive impact on their fiscal capacity. Specifically, we analyse the impact of 
being a capital or central municipality, factors which have not received much attention 
in the academic literature. However, Greene et al. (1977), Ladd and Yinger (1989), 
Chernick and Tkachera (2002) do analyse whether commuter costs are offset by the 
revenues commuters generate, concluding that commuter costs (reflecting centrality) 
tend to be higher than any additional revenues. This paper provides further empirical 
evidence on this question, analysing from a wider perspective than that taken by these 
earlier studies (that is, by taking into account other factors in addition to commuting) 
whether the various costs borne by large municipalities are offset by the revenue 
generated by the economic activity, for instance, that the large municipalities can 
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attract. To do so we draw on a dataset for Spanish municipalities with more than 75,000 
inhabitants,1 and estimate an equation of the determinants of both expenditure needs 
(see, Bosch and Solé, 2005) and fiscal capacity.  
The present study comprises six sections, the first being this introduction. Section 2 
deals with the question as to what we might consider to constitute a large municipality 
in Spain, and this concept is then defined within the framework of the present 
legislation. Section 3 describes the specific traits of large municipalities, in terms of 
their costs and revenues. Section 4 reports the empirical analysis and describes the data 
used in the estimation of the equations of the expenditure needs and the fiscal capacity 
of large municipalities. Section 5 describes the main results obtained. Finally, section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Large municipalities in Spain: regulatory framework 
 
In undertaking this study we first need to clarify which of Spain’s municipalities 
should be classified as large and on what grounds. In this regard, we need to determine 
whether population size is the sole trait that should be taken into account, or whether 
there are other characteristics, such as a municipality’s level of economic activity, or the 
fact of its being an institutional/cultural capital or centre of a metropolitan area, that 
need also to be taken into consideration. 
The concept of large municipality (city or large city) does not have an unequivocal 
definition in Spain. Indeed, the various laws regulating local government fail to 
establish any common criteria. Law 57/2003, for example, in outlining measures for 
modernizing local governments provides for a distinct system of organisation for 
municipalities with a large population, defined as i) those with a population over 
250,000 inhabitants; ii) provincial capitals with a population over 175,000 inhabitants; 
iii) provincial capitals, capitals of the Autonomous Community or hosts of the 
headquarters of regional institutions (independent of population size); iv) those with a 
population over 75,000 inhabitants that present special economic, social, historic or 
cultural circumstances. 
Elsewhere, the Spanish Law on Local Authorities, which determines the designation 
of compulsory competences on the basis of municipal population size, divides 
municipalities into population ranges, the highest of which is municipalities with a 
population over 50,000 inhabitants. Article 26 of this law lists the minimum 
competences that can, as such, be required of all municipalities. They are as follows: 
public lighting, cemeteries, waste collection, street cleaning, the domestic supply of 
drinking water, drains and sewers, access roads to centres of population, paving of 
public roads and control of food and beverages. 
On the basis of population size, municipalities are designated additional 
competences. Specifically, municipalities with a population over 5,000 inhabitants are 
also responsible for public parks, public libraries, markets and waste treatment. Those 
with a population over 20,000 inhabitants are responsible for public safety, provision of 
social services, fire prevention and extinction and public sports facilities. Finally, 
municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are required to provide public urban 
passenger transport and environmental protection. As such, all municipalities with over 
50,000 inhabitants have the same expenditure competences. 
As for financing, before the introduction of Law 51/2002, the same model of 
financing was applied to all the municipalities, with some adjustments being made 
                                                 
1 We use this threshold to define a large municipality as it is the threshold applied in Spanish legislation 
to differentiate municipalities in terms of their respective financing systems (see Section 2). 
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according to population size, affecting above all tax rates and unconditional transfers. 
Law 51/2002, however, established a different financing model for large municipalities, 
defining the latter as: i) those with a population over 75,000 inhabitants, and ii) those 
that are provincial capitals and/or capitals of an Autonomous Community. To these 
municipalities the State concedes a part of the revenue from the following taxes: 
personal income tax, value added tax and excise taxes (hydrocarbons, alcohol and 
tobacco); thus, implicitly recognising their greater expenditure needs. However, Bosch 
and Solé (2005) report that, in the case of Spanish municipalities, the cost of the 
provision of local services per inhabitant does not increase above a population of 20,000 
inhabitants. This finding underpins the FEMP2 Report’s (Suárez et al., 2008) 
recommendations for reforming local financing in Spain and the need for the concession 
of a percentage of personal income tax and VAT to all municipalities with a population 
over 20,000. 
In the case of Spain, special reference should be made to the cities of Madrid and 
Barcelona, which have historically sought compensation for their capital costs and as 
such have remained outside the system for distributing unconditional grants. However, 
with the introduction of Law 51/2002 they also receive their share of the 
aforementioned tax revenues. In 2006 two laws were passed, Law 1/2006 of 13 March, 
which regulated a special system for the municipality of Barcelona, and Law 22/2006 of 
4 July which recognised the capital status of Madrid and regulated a special system for 
the city. However, these laws do not contemplate a distinct financing system for these 
two cities but rather refer to aspects of their competences, administration, and 
organisation. Indeed, currently neither city receives any specific compensation for its 
central and capital costs. As pointed out, to date these two cities have only been granted 
special financial regulations as regards the distribution of unconditional grants, but in no 
circumstances have calculations been based on any objective criteria. These cases differ 
in this regard from those of Pamplona and Santiago de Compostela, which do receive 
compensation for the costs of being capitals from their respective Autonomous 
Communities. 
In short, Spanish legislation regulating local government draws a distinction 
between municipalities on the basis of the size of their population; however, this 
distinction differs according to the specific area being regulated (be it, organisation, 
competences or financing). As such, no single definition is provided as to what 
constitutes a large municipality (or city), although being an institutional capital is 
recognised as a distinctive feature to be taken into account. We take as our definition of 
large municipalities those with a population over 75,000 inhabitants, that is, adopting 
the categorisation used in the State’s financing system. 
 
3. The specific characteristics of large municipalities 
 
3.1. Cost factors: central and capital costs 
 
3.1.1. Central costs 
 
Central costs are those generated by the specific problems faced by large 
municipalities situated at the centre of an urban agglomeration. The main central cost is 
attributable to the flow of non-residents (those residing at a certain distance from the 
municipality in question) and which central cities absorb each day. Here, the main cost 
                                                 
2 The FEMP (Federación Española de Municipios y Provincias) is the Spanish Federation of 
Municipalities and Provinces. 
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is caused by the overloading effect that municipal services are put under. Other central 
costs are attributable to the concentration of social problems (immigration, poverty, etc.) 
and those related to diseconomies of scale, density or congestion. Each of these costs is 
briefly described below. 
 
Cost of the overloading effect on municipal services 
 
A central municipality typically receives a large flow of non-residents: for reasons 
of work (commuters), education, shopping, administrative activities and leisure. These 
non-resident visitors use the services provided by the municipality for its inhabitants 
(and tax payers). The main costs for the municipality generated by non-residents can be 
identified as traffic management, cleaning, urban waste management, the maintenance 
of parks and public spaces as well as the provision of cultural and sports facilities and 
citizen safety and security. 
For the Spanish case, the literature here is not very extensive and comprises 
basically the studies undertaken by Solé-Ollé (2001, 2006) and Bosch and Solé-Ollé 
(2005) examining the impact on the cost of the provision of municipal services of daily 
visitors who come to the central city for reasons of work and study. More specifically, 
Solé-Ollé (2001) quantifies the effects of a range of variables on the cost of providing 
municipal services in the municipalities of the Barcelona province with more than 5,000 
inhabitants in 1996, concluding that commuters have an impact on expenditure on 
citizen safety and security, culture and sports, housing and urban development and 
public welfare. Solé-Ollé (2001) excludes, for reasons of comparability with the rest of 
the municipalities, the City of Barcelona; however, this inconvenience is solved in 
Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2005) and Solé-Ollé (2006) which draw on a sample of more than 
3,000 Spanish municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants in the year 1999. In these 
studies the impact of non-residents on municipal public services is measured using the 
size of the population (i.e., potential non-resident users of the central city’s public 
services) residing in locations within a 30-kilometre radius of the main central city. 
Solé-Ollé (2006) reports that a non-resident generates an average increase of 9.4% in 
the municipal expenditure generated by a resident, a figure that rises to 24% in the case 
of residents in municipalities located in large urban areas. 
Another type of non-resident with quite specific characteristics is the tourist. Here 
the costs will be either direct (promotion paid for by the city council) or indirect (greater 
intensity of use of public services such as transport, cleaning, cultural activity and 
security). 
 
Cost of the concentration of social problems 
 
Central cities typically attract social problems associated with immigration, poverty 
(the medium-high income population having abandoned the core areas) and 
delinquency. Solé-Ollé (2001) reports, for example, that rising poverty levels increase 
the cost of citizen safety and security, social services, culture and sports, and housing 
and urban development. Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2005) further report that immigrant 
population is potentially related with poverty and with a positive and statistically 
significant impact on municipal expenditure. 
 
Other cost factors 
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The level of population has an impact on public service unit costs, either reducing 
(economies of scale) or raising them (costs of congestion). The costs of congestion may 
be related to the effects of population density, which is normally higher in large 
municipalities. A high population density can, for example, increase the costs related to 
traffic, delinquency and the destruction of urban furniture. Likewise, in some cases, a 
low population density can also generate higher costs in the provision of public 
services, including refuse collection, public lighting or security (costs related to 
dispersed populations). For a detailed discussion of urban agglomerations seen from the 
perspective of public finance, see Cadaval (2004). 
 
3.1.2. Capital costs 
 
Capital costs are related to the presence in the municipality of State and 
Autonomous Community government institutions. The main costs in this case can be 
grouped into two categories: i) loss of income due to activity substitution, and ii) an 
increase in expenditure due to activity substitution. Each of these factors is described 
briefly below. 
 
Loss of income due to activity substitution 
 
A municipality that serves as a political capital specialises in activities of an 
administrative nature and as a result the resources of the municipality (some of which 
are scarce, such as land) are used for administrative activities as opposed to other 
economic (primarily commerce and services) or residential activities. Activity 
substitution is not a neutral factor for the municipal treasury when the administrative 
activities of the Autonomous Communities and the State are exempt from payment of 
municipal taxes. So, for example, if a municipality contains the headquarters of 
government institutions it no longer receives the property tax corresponding to 
residences and/or businesses that hypothetically could occupy the area used for 
administrative purposes.3 This argument can be extended to other taxes in the municipal 
domain, for example the Motor Vehicle Tax and some fees and public prices. 
 
Increase in expenditure due to activity substitution 
 
It might also be the case that the substitution of residential, commercial and service 
activities with administrative activities generates an increase in municipal expenditure, 
for instance, in activities concerned with security and public safety (public events), in 
urban development and the maintenance of public spaces (parks and gardens), in the 
protection of historical heritage sites and the improvement and promotion of the image 
of the capital. These impacts are difficult to quantify although Bosch and Solé-Ollé 
(2005) propose a methodology that uses public sector employees (autonomous and 
central governments) per inhabitant as an approximation of municipal expenditure 
needs. 
 
3.2. Revenue factors: benefits from being a capital/central municipality 
 
The centrality or capital status of a large municipality can also potentially generate 
additional revenue. For instance, economies of agglomeration and infrastructures of 
                                                 
3 This argument remains valid as long as the urban land available is fixed and its occupation by the 
administration tends to drive other economic activities outside the municipal area. 
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communication can attract the localisation of individuals and firms to large 
municipalities, and so have a positive effect on their fiscal capacity (Ladd and 
Bradbury, 1988). In this sense, Brueckner et al. (1999) report in a theoretical analysis 
conducted in Paris that individuals with higher levels of income tend to localise in zones 
with the best amenities (which in many cases are in, or close to, large urban areas). 
Therefore, we also analyse the effect that all the aforementioned factors might have 
on the fiscal capacity of large municipalities. For instance, it is not clear whether the 
benefits of the economic activity generated by visitors (commuters or tourists) offset 
their costs (given the limited revenue instruments available to the municipalities). 
Empirical evidence from the United States seems to indicate that the costs derived from 
commuting are not recovered by such large cities as New York and Philadelphia (see 
Chernik and Tkacheva, 2002). Green et al. (1977) also evaluate the additional costs and 
revenues generated by non-residents for the US city of Washington. 
Tourist enclaves exhibit many characteristics that are highly attractive to visitors 
and which can affect the fiscal capacity of the municipality through, for instance, a 
higher demand for housing. In such cases, real estate prices rise and, as a result, the 
value of the property tax base also rises. While only a few studies have sought to 
analyse whether tourism determines the tax base volume of a jurisdiction, Glaeser et al. 
(2000) are able to show that American cities with the highest amenity levels (variety of 
private services, adequate climatology, etc.) have higher housing prices, which in turn 
means a higher value of the property tax base. Likewise, Hawkins and Murray (2004) 
show that the number of hotels per capita, as a proxy of the number of visitors for 
leisure purposes, has a markedly positive effect on the per capita bases of a city’s sales 
taxes. 
In some ways, the previously presented costs could be seen as potential revenue 
raisers. Apart from the obvious cases of commuting (work, studies, shopping, 
administrative activities and leisure) and tourism, which are easily identified as 
potential sources of revenue for recipient municipalities via a variety of channels, other 
variables, including immigration, unit costs (wages) or activity substitution, could have 
a positive impact on a municipality’s fiscal capacity. Indeed, all of them could attract 
more economic activity and, hence, increase directly and indirectly local revenues such 
as property tax or the tax on economic activities. Few studies to date have tested 
whether these factors also affect the fiscal capacity and, so, the analysis undertaken here 
also represents a new contribution to the testing of this relationship. 
 
4. Empirical analysis: methodology and data issues 
 
4.1. Estimation of an equation of expenditure needs 
 
The quantification of expenditure needs is based on econometric estimations of the 
average estimated impact of the cost variables (both central and capital) on municipal 
expenditure per inhabitant. In this way we can quantify the additional expenditure 
(measured with regard to the average) that these variables represent given the actual 
value that they take for each municipality under consideration (see Solé, 2001, 2006). In 
line with Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2005), the determinants of municipal expenditure can be 
expressed as: 
 
εβββα ++++= )ln()ln()ln()/ln( 321 XFZpopg   (1) 
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where g/pop is the per capita expenditure (current or total),4 Z is a vector of cost 
variables, F is a vector of fiscal variables that account for the resources available to the 
municipality, X is a vector of other variables that are taken into account and ε is the 
error term. 
 
4.2. Estimation of an index of fiscal capacity 
 
Estimating the impact of different variables on the fiscal capacity of a municipality 
requires that this index is first calculated. This is by no means straightforward as there is 
more than one way of calculating it, and there are various difficulties that must be 
overcome. 
An index of fiscal capacity must capture as closely as possible the fiscal capacity of 
the municipality. In order to do this various methods have been proposed to measure the 
potential revenues of a municipality: i) tax collection; ii) macroeconomic indicators, 
including municipal GDP or municipal income; and iii) microeconomic indicators, 
including the Representative Tax System (RTS).5 More specifically, the RTS draws on 
the available information for the tax base (B) of any type of municipal revenue and the 
standard tax rate (t). With this information, and using the RTS approach, the index of 
fiscal capacity can be constructed as: 
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where n is the number of different revenue sources considered and N is the total number 
of municipalities considered. Eq. (2) can also be expressed as: 
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where αj is the share (summing up to 1) of each type of revenue in a representative 
budget and b is the tax base expressed in per capita terms.6 Given the budgetary 
structure of revenues for large municipalities, for our calculations we opt to use just the 
property tax and the tax on economic activity. In 2008 these local taxes represent 22.9% 
of current revenues and 66.7% of tax revenues.7 
In the case of the property tax (the main source of municipal revenue), there is a 
major shortcoming to our obtaining a true measure of the fiscal capacity. The measure 
of the tax base is the cadastral value of the properties located in the municipality; 
however, the cadastral values are not homogenously updated for all municipalities. In 
                                                 
4 The measure of expenditure used is the current expenditure per capita. Nevertheless, for reasons of the 
robustness of the estimation the total expenditure per capita is also used. 
5 The Representative Revenue System (RSS) might also be used when the revenues based on the benefit 
principle are also included in the fiscal capacity index. However, we opted not to include these revenues 
(user fees and public prices) in our calculations given that they are endogenous to political decisions, at 
least, more so than the other sources of revenue used. 
6 The advantage of this formulation is that it avoids our having to calculate the standard tax rate. 
7 On average, in 2008, the municipal non-financial revenue for large municipalities comes basically from 
grants (36.9%) and local taxes (34.5%). Moreover, there are also fees, sales, and fines (17.2%), property 
income (6.6%) and tax shares on national taxes (4.8%). 
8
other words, local governments can endogenously decide when to revise cadastral 
values and, hence, to increase (or otherwise) the tax base of the property tax.8 There are 
two ways in which we can overcome this problem: by correcting the cadastral value or 
by implementing a correction via the tax rates. The first option is in practice particularly 
difficult to implement because we would require data on the evolution of the market 
prices of properties in all the municipalities and for all years or, alternatively, the 
evolution of data on housing prices (assuming that all properties evolve in a similar 
fashion to housing). 
The second option is the correction of the tax base via tax rates based on the 
assumption that nominal tax rates differ between municipalities according to the time 
elapsed since the last updating of cadastral values. More specifically, we expect lower 
tax rates in those municipalities that have most recently revised their cadastral values.9 
Indeed, in the appendix we provide evidence supporting this assumption.10 In practical 
terms, we use tax rate information to modify the property tax base: to each municipality 
i, and depending if it has revised cadastral values in 2001 or not, we apply the average 
tax rate of all those municipalities that have revised their cadastral values in the same 
period of time (before or after 2001). 
In the case of the tax on economic activity, we use the municipal tax base (the so-
called Cuotas mínimas), which is the estimated contents of each business, professional 
and artistic activity weighted by coefficients depending on the location and turnover of 
the activities present in the municipality. 
Therefore, we construct an index of fiscal capacity for large municipalities in Spain 
as presented in Eq. (3), with the shares (α) of the property tax and the tax on economic 
activity being equal to 84 and 16%, respectively. Once the measure has been 
constructed we can then estimate its possible determinants in the same way as for the 
expenditure needs presented in Eq. (1). 
 
uSFfc i +∂+∂+= )ln()ln()ln( 21γ     (4) 
 
where fc is the index of fiscal capacity of municipality i, F is a vector of fiscal variables, 
S is a vector of economic and socio-demographic variables (some of which may 
coincide with the expenditure needs equation) and u is the error term. 
 
4.3. Variables and data used for the estimation of expenditure needs 
 
                                                 
8 In this sense, uncorrected tax bases (those in the municipalities that have not updated their cadastral 
values) would present a lower capacity index because of a political decision, and one moreover that does 
not reflect the reality of the municipality, that is, its true potential fiscal capacity through, for example, its 
actual housing values. 
9 The effective tax burden on a municipality is obtained by combining both the nominal tax rate and the 
extent to which the tax base (cadastral value) resembles the market price of the cadastral unit. Thus, given 
a municipality’s revenue target, and in the absence of the corresponding revaluation of cadastral value, we 
would expect a higher nominal rate in those municipalities with cadastral values that have not been 
revised for some time. 
10 In the appendix, Figure A.1 shows graphically a negative relation between property tax rate and the last 
year of cadastral revision. Figure A.2 shows how the distribution of municipalities with regard to their 
last cadastral revision is bimodal, with 2001 being the cut-off point of that distribution. Finally Table A.1, 
based on the foregoing information, shows that municipalities that last revised their cadastral values 
before 2001 have a property tax rate that is 0.26 points higher than those with cadastral values revised 
after 2001. 
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For the empirical estimation, all the municipalities that had over 75,000 inhabitants 
in 2008 are available, except Granada;11 hence, we have information for 91 large 
municipalities in Spain. However, for reasons of data availability, we perform some of 
the estimations for a subsample of 86 municipalities, that is, excluding the 
municipalities of the Basque Country and Navarra. Table 1 presents summary statistics 
of all the variables used in the empirical estimations and which are described below. 
 
Dependent variable 
 
The econometric estimations take the current municipal expenditure per inhabitant 
(gc/pop) as a dependent variable, as well as the total non-financial municipal 
expenditure per inhabitant (gt/pop). All municipal budgetary data come from the 
Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Overloading effects (central costs) 
 
We compute the population resident within a 30-km radius of the municipality to 
proxy the overloading effect on its public services resulting from the (daily) use of non-
resident visitors. The municipal population data are obtained from the Spanish National 
Statistics Institute (INE in its Spanish acronym) for the year 2008. More specifically, 
the variable constructed (potential_users) is a measure of the potential users (population 
within 30-km radius) in relation to the population of the central city interacted with a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the municipality is considered a central city 
and 0 if the municipality is peripheral and close to a central city. By interacting potential 
users with this dummy variable means we only take into account those municipalities 
that have a power of attraction over their neighbouring municipalities. 
To estimate the impact on municipal expenditure of the number of tourists we use a 
municipal tourist index (i_tourism) calculated from the data provided by the “Spain 
Economic Yearbook” edited by La Caixa savings bank. The index is expressed as a 
percentage of the Spanish total and in relation to the resident population in the 
municipality (also expressed as a percentage of the Spanish total). This variable seeks to 
capture the intensive use of the resources of central municipalities that attract a large 
tourist population (because of such services as museums, cultural activities, beaches, 
etc.). 
To approximate the overloading effect we use the employ_serv variable that 
represents the number of employees in the municipality working in the service sector in 
relation to the municipality’s total population. This variable is created using data from 
the Institute of Economic Research of Valencia (IVIE in its Spanish acronym) and 
approximates the intensive use of the service sector in central municipalities that can 
attract the neighbouring population for consumer activities. 
                                                 
11 The budgetary information for this municipality is not available. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Definition Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
gt/pop Total non-financial expenditure per inhabitant in 2008 91 1049.83 318.55 625.08 3124.58
gc/pop Current expenditure per inhabitant in 2008 91 848.52 247.10 535.18 2473.45
potential_users Population within 30km per inhabitant * Dummy = 1 if central municipality in 2008 91 1.09 1.47 0.00 6.78 
i_tourism 
Touristic index (as a % of Spanish total index) / 
population (as a % of Spanish total population) 
in 2007 
91 0.93 1.64 0.01 11.37 
employ_serv  Employees in the service sector / population in 2008 91 0.74 0.09 0.48 0.91 
immg_non_eu Foreigners from outside the EU / population in 2008 91 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.25 
unemp Unemployment rate in 2008 91 5.6 1.88 2.4 10.6 
w_cost Wage per worker paid in the local administration in 2006 (index Spain = 1) 91 2.44 2.23 0.19 10.65 
employ_public Employees of the central and autonomous administration in 2006 / population 91 0.023 0.021 0.003 0.108 
urban_area/pop Urban area (km2) in relation to the population in 2008 86 0.014 0.011 0.002 0.073 
pop_under_16 Population under 16 years of age / population in 2008 91 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.23 
pop_over_65 Population over 65 years of age / population in 2008 91 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.22 
pop_20_64  Population over 19 and under 65 years of age / population in 2008 91 0.65 0.02 0.61 0.73 
pop_illiterate Illiterate + population without schooling / population in 2001 91 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.27 
pop_higher_educ Population with higher education / population in 2001 91 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.46 
current_transf/pop Revenue from current transfers per inhabitant in 2008  91 5.70 0.39 4.42 6.94 
capital_transf/pop Revenue from capital transfers per inhabitant in 2008  91 3.38 1.01 0.59 5.30 
own_taxes/pop Revenue from own taxes per inhabitant in 2008 91 5.81 0.28 4.59 6.67 
fc Fiscal capacity index (index Spain = 1) in 2008 85 1.00 0.45 0.39 2.81 
property_tax_08 Property tax rate in 2008 85 0.68 0.18 0.38 1.17 
property_tax_07 Property tax rate in 2007 85 0.68 0.17 0.42 1.17 
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Concentration of social problems (central costs) 
 
The number of immigrants allows us to capture the influence of social factors on 
municipal expenditure. The data are obtained from the official register of residents 
published by the INE. Specifically, we use the percentage of foreign nationals from 
outside the EU in relation to the total population of the municipality (immg_non_eu). 
To account for other social factors we use the municipal unemployment rate in 2008 
(unemp), which should also capture the level of economic activity in the municipality. 
 
Costs of the factors (capital costs) 
 
The variation in public sector salary costs between municipalities is introduced as a 
capital cost. This variable, w_cost, is calculated as the total amount of wages in relation 
to the total number of workers in the local administration of the municipality.12 Another 
variable, which likewise approximates the capital costs that a municipality incurs, is the 
number of workers employed in the central and autonomous administration 
(employ_public) that are present in the municipality. This variable is obtained by 
subtracting the number of workers in the local public administration (available from the 
official figures published by the Spanish Ministry of Public Administration – the 
Statistical Bulletin of Personnel Serving in the Public Administration) from the total 
number of workers in the municipality employed in the “public administration, defence 
and obligatory social security” (employment data taken from the two digit National 
Classification of Economic Activities published by IVIE). As with the other 
employment variables, they are calculated for the year 2006.13 
 
Other expenditure needs 
 
In addition to the above variables that capture the features of the municipalities’ 
capital and central statuses, we use other potential determinants of their expenditure 
needs. The urban area in relation to the population in 2008 (urban_area/pop) is taken 
into account to capture the effect of density on the cost of providing municipal services. 
This variable is constructed with the area of buildings and building lots in each 
municipality (in square meters) in relation to its total population (data taken from the 
Cadastral Register). 
Other variables included are those that refer to the characteristics of the municipal 
population that might have an impact on public expenditure: specifically, the population 
under 16 years of age in relation to the total population of the municipality 
(pop_under_16)14 and the population over 65 years of age in relation to the total 
population of the municipality (pop_over_65). These variables, calculated for the year 
                                                 
12 The number of workers in the local administration in each municipality is calculated as follows; first, 
the number of local administration workers as a percentage of all public workers is obtained from 
provincial data; second, this percentage is then applied over the total number of public workers at the 
municipal level. 
13 In the estimations presented in section 5, we opt to introduce both variables (w_cost and 
employ_public) in some regressions in spite of their having a high correlation coefficient (0.8), since we 
consider each to capture different aspects of capital costs – one the possible salary differentials between 
cities, and the other the presence of other administrations in the municipality. 
14 As a robustness exercise we also use the ratio between the population under 19 years of age and the 
total population of the municipality (pop_under_19). These results are fairly consistent with those 
presented in section 5. 
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2008, measure the impact of the presence in the municipality of two groups of 
individuals who are likely to be the main receivers of municipal public services. A 
similar argument underpins the decision to include in the regressions the variables for 
the illiterate population and the population without schooling in relation to the total 
population of the municipality (pop_illiterate) and the population with higher education 
in relation to the total population of the municipality (pop_higher_educ). In this way 
we are able to control the level of municipal expenditure in relation to the characteristics 
of the resident population, as these variables capture resident needs in a particular 
municipality as regards one level of expenditure or another. In this case, given that 
census data from the INE are required for their construction, the variables refer to 
values for the year 2001. 
 
Availability of revenue 
 
The estimations of the equations for expenditure needs also require the use of 
variables associated with the revenues obtained by the municipality. The revenue from 
current transfers in relation to the population of the municipality in 2008 
(current_transf/pop) is used in the regressions to quantify the resources received by the 
municipality from other levels of government. We assume that the municipalities that 
receive most transfers can spend more. Likewise, income from capital transfers in 
relation to the population of the municipality for 2008 (capital_transf/pop) as well as 
the revenue from their own taxes per capita (own_taxes/pop) are calculated. 
 
4.4. Variables and data used for the estimation of fiscal capacity 
 
In general, the variables that might affect the fiscal capacity of a municipality are 
primarily fiscal variables and economic and socio-demographic variables. Below, we 
provide a detailed description of the variables included in the estimation of Eq. (4). 
 
Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is the fiscal capacity index (fc) as described in detail in 
section 4.2 and in the appendix. We use data from the Cadastral Register which includes 
detailed information for all municipalities (except those in the Basque Country and 
Navarra). The urban land registry files include variables that accurately identify the 
municipality, province and Autonomous Community to which the municipality belongs. 
They also include information for the year of the last cadastral revision, the number of 
urban units, the assessed value (in thousands of euros), the number of property tax 
receipts and taxable income (in thousands of euros). Finally, the dataset includes the tax 
rate applied by each municipality and the tax deductions. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Fiscal variables 
 
In the short run, the main determinant of the fiscal capacity of a municipality is the 
tax rate on property, the main source of revenue for local governments with a fairly 
fixed tax base. Thus, as a determinant of fiscal capacity we include the property tax rate 
in the municipality in 2008 (property_tax_08). However, this rate is not exogenous to 
the fiscal capacity itself and, as a result, we might face problems of endogeneity. To 
13
overcome this problem we estimate the fiscal capacity equation using a 2-SLS 
procedure, using as instruments of the property tax rate in the municipality in 2008 the 
property tax rate in the previous year (property_tax_07) and the other sources of 
revenue current_transf/pop, capital_transf/pop and own_taxes/pop.15 
 
Economic and socio-demographic variables 
 
To analyse other possible determinants of the fiscal capacity of a given 
municipality, we adhere to a strategy founded on the fact that, a priori, many of the 
variables presented as costs factors might also well have a positive impact on a 
municipality’s revenues. As discussed above, certain variables might also attract 
economic activity to the municipality, such as potential users (potential_users), tourists 
(i_tourism), a predominant presence of the service sector (employ_serv), immigration 
(immg_non_eu), higher wages (w_cost) or the presence of public servants from other 
administrations (employ_public). 
Note that for some of the socio-demographic variables, we have no a priori 
expectations regarding their impact (if any) on the municipality’s fiscal capacity. This is 
the case for those variables that refer to the characteristics of the municipal population   
(pop_under_16 and pop_over_65)16 and those that capture the educational level of the 
population (pop_illiterate and pop_higher_educ). In the case of unemployment 
(unemp), we expect a negative sign with respect to the fiscal capacity index, whereas 
we expect a positive impact of the variable capturing the urban surface area in relation 
to the population in 2008 (urban_area/pop). 
 
4.5. Simultaneous determination of needs and capacity 
 
Finally, it might also be the case that the fiscal capacity determines the expenditure 
needs of a municipality or vice versa: i.e. a municipality might make its spending 
decisions in line with the fiscal capacity of its tax bases or (productive) expenditure 
might have a positive impact on the tax bases of the municipality and, hence, increase 
its fiscal capacity. Moreover, the aforementioned endogeneity problem might also be 
seen as simultaneous decisions being taken regarding property tax rate and fiscal 
capacity (and spending). In order to address this issue we estimate a simultaneous 
equation model using 3-SLS as follows:  
 
vFpopgfctaxproptaxprop
uSFpopgtaxpropfc
fcXFZpopg
+++++=
+∂+∂+∂+∂+=
+++++=
)ln()/ln()ln()07__ln()08__ln(
)ln()ln()/ln()08__ln()ln(
)ln()ln()ln()ln()/ln(
4321
4321
4321
λλλλσ
γ
εββββα
(5) 
 
In Eq. (5) municipal expenditure per inhabitant (g/pop), current and total, is both a 
dependent variable and enters as an explanatory variable of the fiscal capacity. 
Similarly, fc is also introduced as a determinant of expenditures needs. Finally, fiscal 
capacity and the property tax rate are also assumed to be decided simultaneously. 
                                                 
15 In the estimates of the determinants of the fiscal capacity we do not include property tax revenues in the 
calculation of own_taxes/pop. 
16 Given that the economic interpretation of the estimated coefficients for these variables is difficult in 
relation to fiscal capacity, we also construct the variable pop_20_64. This indicates the share of the 
population aged between 20 and 64, and so serves as a proxy of the municipality’s active population. 
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5. Main results 
 
The results of the estimation of the equation for expenditure needs are presented in 
Table 2 for the sample of 91 municipalities (columns 1 and 2) and for the sample of 85 
municipalities with more than 75,000 inhabitants (columns 3 and 4). As discussed 
above, we do not have access to cadastral data for the municipalities of the Basque 
Country or those of Navarra and, hence, we are unable to use variables such as the 
urban surface area in relation to the population as a determinant of expenditure needs. 
The estimations have been carried out using two definitions of the dependent variable: 
current expenditure per capita and total non-financial expenditure per capita. 
 
Table 2. Expenditure needs in municipalities with more than 75,000 inhabitants in 
Spain. OLS estimates. 
 Full sample No Basque Country and Navarra municipalities 
VARIABLES Current needs Total needs Current needs Total needs 
 l_gc/pop l_gt/pop l_gc/pop l_gt/pop
     
potential_users 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
l_i_tourism 0.039** 0.042** 0.038** 0.042** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
l_employ_serv 0.439** 0.433** 0.615*** 0.546*** 
 (0.189) (0.179) (0.207) (0.196) 
l_immg_non_eu -0.006 0.025 0.026 0.045 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.032) 
l_unemp -0.084 -0.113 -0.033 -0.081 
 (0.100) (0.094) (0.106) (0.100) 
l_w_cost 0.254*** 0.300*** 0.296*** 0.321*** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.050) (0.047) 
l_employ_public 0.258*** 0.286*** 0.291*** 0.292*** 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.055) (0.052) 
l_urban_area/pop   0.010 -0.023 
   (0.040) (0.038) 
l_pop_under_16 0.821*** 0.799*** 0.752*** 0.791*** 
 (0.183) (0.173) (0.196) (0.186) 
l_pop_over_65 0.171* 0.160* 0.168* 0.158* 
 (0.095) (0.090) (0.096) (0.091) 
l_pop_higher_educ -0.179** -0.103 -0.143 -0.066 
 (0.085) (0.081) (0.087) (0.083) 
l_pop_illiterate -0.054 -0.058 0.001 -0.026 
 (0.065) (0.061) (0.075) (0.071) 
l_current_transf/pop 0.402*** 0.407*** 0.284*** 0.296*** 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.071) (0.068) 
l_capital_transf/pop -0.008 0.009 0.006 0.018 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
l_own_taxes/pop 0.111 -0.009 0.014 -0.132 
 (0.086) (0.081) (0.098) (0.093) 
l_fc   0.040 0.096* 
   (0.058) (0.055) 
Constant 6.043*** 7.037*** 7.727*** 8.563*** 
 (0.831) (0.788) (0.985) (0.934) 
     
Observations 91 91 85 85 
R-squared 0.67 0.73 0.67 0.74 
F 10.82*** 14.71*** 8.73*** 11.96*** 
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. We obtain robust estimates 
eliminating Barcelona and Madrid from the sample and using an index of fiscal capacity, as explanatory 
variable, based only in the property tax. 
 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that, in the case of factors related to central costs (i.e., 
the overloading effects), the number of tourists and the number of employees in the 
service sector are positive, statistically significant determinants. Moreover, given that 
these variables are introduced in log format, they can be interpreted as elasticities. 
Hence, a one per cent increase in the tourist index increases total non-financial 
expenditure per capita by 4.2%, while a one percent increase in the share of employees 
engaged in the service sector increases total non-financial expenditure per capita 
between 43 and 54%. By contrast, the potential number of users of the municipality’s 
public services (measured in terms of the population resident within a 30-km radius of 
the central city in relation to the total population of the city interacted with a dummy 
variable indicating the municipality’s central status) is not statistically significant. 
Immigration and unemployment variables do not seem to be significant determinants of 
expenditure needs either. 
As for the factors representing capital costs, the two variables tested were found to 
be positive and statistically significant factors with an estimated impact of around 30%. 
These results indicate that the number of workers employed by the central and 
autonomous administrations located in the municipality, in addition to the salaries paid 
to the employees of the local administration, have a positive impact on municipal 
expenditure. 
The results obtained for the variables capturing the municipalities’ expenditure 
needs, including the share of population under 16, are statistically significant and 
positive with a very high estimated elasticity (80%).17 Similarly, the share of population 
over 65 is also positive, but this factor presents a lower level of significance and a lower 
point estimate (16%). Both variables reflecting the educational level of the population 
and the population density variable were found not to be statistically significant. In the 
case of the fiscal variables, the estimations conducted confirm that only revenue derived 
from current transfers has a positive impact on expenditure needs. Note that these 
results are fairly robust according to the four models analysed (two dependent variables 
and two samples) and do not present significant differences across the estimated 
models. 
The results of the estimation of the equation for fiscal capacity using instrumental 
variables are shown in Table 3. First, the Sargan test reported at the bottom of Table 3 
determines the validity of the instruments used. Second, as expected, the property tax 
rate has a negative impact on the fiscal capacity index (equal, remember, to 84 and 16% 
of the tax bases of the property tax and the tax on economic activity, respectively). 
Third, in the case of the impact of the variables that account for the centrality costs of 
municipalities we find, in line with the expenditure needs estimation, that the variables 
capturing the number of potential users and the level of immigration in the municipality 
are not statistically significant, whereas tourism (6-10%) and the number of employees 
in the service sector (70%-80%) are positive and significant determinants of the fiscal 
capacity index of the municipality. Moreover, unemployment is found to be significant 
and to present a negative sign; that is, the higher the level of unemployment in the 
                                                 
17 This result would seem to reflect the fact that municipalities in Spain are, by large, key providers of 
children’s services, including daycare, which while not obligatory competences are in great demand from 
local residents. 
16
municipality, the lower is its fiscal capacity – a result that, in principle, makes economic 
sense. 
 
Table 3. Fiscal capacity in municipalities with more than 75,000 inhabitants in Spain 
(excluding municipalities in the Basque Country and Navarra). Instrumental variable 
estimates using 2-SLS. 
VARIABLES l_fc l_fc l_fc l_fc 
     
l_property_tax_08 -0.260* -0.269* -0.296** -0.363** 
 (0.148) (0.143) (0.142) (0.144) 
potential_users 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.021 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
l_i_tourism 0.058* 0.059* 0.064** 0.096*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) 
l_employ_serv 0.658 0.704* 0.825** 0.429 
 (0.418) (0.422) (0.394) (0.379) 
l_immg_non_eu -0.006 -0.003 0.014 -0.011 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.063) (0.065) 
l_unemp -0.296 -0.327* -0.317* -0.384** 
 (0.199) (0.189) (0.189) (0.194) 
l_w_cost 0.123 0.116 0.171* 0.203** 
 (0.121) (0.119) (0.098) (0.101) 
l_employ_public 0.046 0.043 0.091 0.106 
 (0.128) (0.124) (0.109) (0.113) 
l_urban_area/pop 0.184** 0.172*** 0.168***  
 (0.078) (0.062) (0.062)  
l_pop_under_16 0.316    
 (0.444)    
l_pop_over_65 0.304    
 (0.198)    
l_pop_20_64  -1.347 -1.520 -1.869* 
  (1.082) (1.066) (1.098) 
l_pop_higher_educ -0.019 -0.006 0.003 0.090 
 (0.171) (0.163) (0.163) (0.166) 
l_pop_illiterate 0.100 0.127 0.155 0.209 
 (0.138) (0.134) (0.129) (0.132) 
l_gt/pop 0.185 0.156   
 (0.211) (0.195)   
Constant 0.194 -1.412 -0.078 -1.038 
 (2.367) (2.008) (1.105) (1.085) 
     
Observations 85 85 85 85 
R-squared 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.40 
Sargan 29.03*** 29.04*** 27.67*** 31.08*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. We obtain robust estimates 
eliminating Barcelona and Madrid from the sample, using current expenditure per capita as explanatory 
variable instead of total expenditure per capita and using as a dependent variable an index of fiscal 
capacity based only in the property tax. 
 
Fourth, an inspection of the variables that capture a municipality’s capital status shows 
that the results are not as significant as they are in the expenditure needs equation. Here, 
only the variable that approximates the salaries paid to employees in the local public 
sector is positive and slightly significant (17-20%). Fifth, as regards our findings for the 
other potential determinants of a municipality’s fiscal capacity (in the main, the socio-
demographic variables), the most notable result is the positive and very significant 
impact of population density (which presumably captures the positive impact on the tax 
base of the property tax) and the fact that, in general, the variables capturing the age 
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structure and the level of education of the population do not have a significant effect on 
the fiscal capacity index. 
Finally, as a robustness test of the results obtained up to this juncture and given the 
possible simultaneity of expenditure needs, fiscal capacity and property tax, we estimate 
the three equations simultaneously by means of 3-SLS (see, Eq. 5). The results, reported 
in Table 4, confirm our previous findings. Note that the results suggest a clear 
simultaneity between fiscal capacity and property tax rate, but this is by no means so 
clear when analysing needs and fiscal capacity. In the latter case, note that the fiscal 
capacity index is not a significant determinant of expenditure needs and, likewise, the 
current (or total non-financial) expenditure per capita does not seem to affect the fiscal 
capacity index. Therefore, the results presented above can be considered valid, 
particularly given that the results for the fiscal capacity index (Table 4) were obtained 
by introducing the property tax rate as an explanatory variable and using 2-SLS to 
instrument the possible endogenous determination of tax rates and tax bases, especially 
in the case of the property tax. 
In short, the results in Table 4 show that the centrality variables of tourism and 
employment in the service sector affect both expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. At 
the same time, the number of potential users and immigration are not significant factors, 
although the unemployment rate does have a negative impact on the fiscal capacity of 
municipalities. The capital status variables seem to have a greater impact on expenditure 
needs than they do on fiscal capacity, a finding that is similar for the socio-demographic 
variables which, as expected, seem to have a greater effect on expenditure needs.  
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Table 4. Joint determination of expenditure needs, fiscal capacity and property tax rate 
using 3-SLS. 
 Current 
needs 
Fiscal 
capacity 
Property tax 
rate 
Total  
needs 
Fiscal 
capacity 
Property tax 
rate 
VARIABLES l_gc/pop l_fc l_prop_tax l_gt/pop l_fc l_prop_tax 
       
potential_users 0.007 0.022  0.014 0.029  
 (0.012) (0.022)  (0.011) (0.024)  
l_i_tourism 0.042** 0.047  0.044*** 0.063*  
 (0.017) (0.037)  (0.015) (0.038)  
l_employ_serv 0.795*** 1.059**  0.568*** 1.162**  
 (0.195) (0.480)  (0.180) (0.454)  
l_immg_non_eu 0.022 -0.019  0.045 -0.003  
 (0.031) (0.062)  (0.029) (0.067)  
l_unemp -0.101 -0.425**  -0.101 -0.450**  
 (0.097) (0.181)  (0.090) (0.191)  
l_w_cost 0.332*** 0.220  0.320*** 0.306*  
 (0.049) (0.158)  (0.045) (0.164)  
l_employ_public 0.310*** 0.118  0.287*** 0.188  
 (0.053) (0.163)  (0.048) (0.163)  
l_urban_area/pop 0.051 0.144**  -0.028 0.105  
 (0.044) (0.071)  (0.041) (0.084)  
l_pop_under_16 0.812*** 0.722  0.807*** 0.980*  
 (0.181) (0.478)  (0.167) (0.524)  
l_pop_over_65 0.201** 0.291  0.156* 0.377*  
 (0.091) (0.189)  (0.083) (0.202)  
l_pop_higher_educ -0.161** -0.110  -0.065 -0.086  
 (0.081) (0.160)  (0.074) (0.163)  
l_pop_illiterate 0.021 0.158  -0.018 0.180  
 (0.069) (0.132)  (0.064) (0.135)  
l_current_transf/pop 0.302***  -0.064* 0.280***  -0.058* 
 (0.072)  (0.034) (0.066)  (0.032) 
l_capital_transf/pop 0.009  -0.005 0.016  -0.008 
 (0.016)  (0.008) (0.015)  (0.008) 
l_own_taxes/pop  0.043  0.139 -0.184  0.117 
 (0.130)  (0.093) (0.120)  (0.087) 
l_fc -0.158  -0.317*** 0.119  -0.268*** 
 (0.134)  (0.095) (0.123)  (0.086) 
l_property_tax_08  -0.336**   -0.411**  
  (0.143)   (0.168)  
l_gc/pop  -0.081 0.229***    
  (0.427) (0.064)    
l_property_tax_07   0.834***   0.880*** 
   (0.061)   (0.054) 
l_gt/pop     -0.359 0.170*** 
     (0.401) (0.053) 
Constant 7.699*** 2.410 -2.058*** 8.918*** 5.137 -1.577** 
 (1.057) (4.129) (0.796) (0.974) (4.050) (0.699) 
       
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 
R-squared 0.61 0.42 0.90 0.74 0.39 0.91 
chi2_1 163.33***   235.52***   
chi2_2  66.80***   64.59***  
chi2_3   875.89***   952.54*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. We obtain robust estimates 
eliminating Barcelona and Madrid from the sample and using as a dependent variable an index of fiscal 
capacity based only in the property tax. 
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6. Conclusions  
 
This study has determined the costs and benefits for Spain’s large municipalities 
(defined as those with a population over 75,000 inhabitants) of being a capital or central 
municipality. We bring a series of rigorously tested results to what remains an on-going 
and highly ideological debate in Spain regarding the financing of local governments, 
and especially the governments of large municipalities. While it is indisputable that 
these municipalities face higher costs given their particular nature, it is equally true that 
they also obtain additional economic benefits that need to be evaluated with these costs 
to obtain a complete picture of the public finances of these governments, especially if 
these questions are to be taken into account in possible reforms of the local financing 
system.  
Our results indicate that there are indeed significant cost factors associated with the 
central/capital nature of a municipality that influence the local per capita expenditure of 
these municipalities. These factors are essentially related to the existence of overloading 
effects (central costs) in central cities, measured by the number of tourists and the 
weight of the service sector, and the existence of capital costs associated with the 
amount of employment in other levels of government and the salaries paid in the local 
public sector. Our results also show that the socioeconomic structure can influence 
expenditure needs (primarily, the share of the population under 16 and over 65). 
Interestingly, we also find that the variables capturing the central status of 
municipalities result in an increase in their fiscal capacity, but the variables capturing 
their status as a capital do not seem to be determinants of this fiscal capacity. 
Thus, the main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the centrality 
characteristics of large municipalities in Spain increase their expenditure needs; yet, 
they have a positive impact on their fiscal capacity. As such, centrality implies certain 
additional costs, but it also brings some benefits. By contrast, the capital status of a 
municipality seems to generate mainly costs; that is, being a capital increases 
expenditure needs. Consequently, the local financing system for the large municipalities 
in Spain needs to give greater consideration to factors linked to capital characteristics, 
since the factors associated with the centrality characteristics of municipalities appear to 
be offset by their greater fiscal capacity and, hence, do not, in principle, need to be 
explicitly recognised by the financing system. 
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Appendix: calculations for the index of fiscal capacity 
 
Figure A.1. Property tax (vertical axis) and last year of cadastral revision (horizontal 
axis) 
 
 
 
Figure A.2. Distribution of municipalities depending on the last year of cadastral 
revision. 
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Table A.1. Correction of the tax base of the property tax. 
   
VARIABLES Property tax rate 
   
Discontinuity 0.2643 
 (0.002)*** 
Time -0.0474 
  (0.008)*** 
(Time)^2 0.002 
 (0.016)** 
Constant 0.7121 
 (0.000)*** 
Observations 85 
R-squared 0.1565 
F(3,81)  5.01*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p-values in brackets. 
Discontinuity = 1 if year is previous to 2001. 
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